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    Abstract- MANET, due to the nature of wireless transmission, 
has more security issues compared to wired environments. In this 
paper we specifically considering Tunneling attack which does 
not require exploiting any nodes in the network and can interfere 
with  the  route  establishment  process.    Instead    of    detecting  
suspicious routes  as  in  previous methods,  we  implement  a  
new  method which detects the attacker nodes and works without 
modification of protocol,  using  a  hop-count  and time delay 
analysis    from    the  viewpoint  of  users  without  any  special 
environment assumptions. The proposed work is simulated using 
OPNET and results showing the advantages of proposed work. 
  
    Index Terms- Ad hoc network, hop-count analysis, network 
security, Tunneling attack. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
he  mobile  ad-hoc  network,  MANET  [1],  is  a  developing  
wireless    technology    that    has    been  discussed  in  many 
academic research projects in the last decade. An ad-hoc network 
is inherently a self-organized  network  system   without   any  
infrastructure.  Typically,  the  nodes  act  as  both  host  and 
router  at  the  same  time,  i.e.,  each  node  in  the  network  can  
be  independent  and  based  on  different hardware,  but  when  
communication  is  needed  it  serves  as  a  data  transmitting  
router  after  a  route discovery procedure. So  far,  many  routing  
protocols  have  been  proposed  for  MANET,  such  as  DSDV  
(Destination  Sequence  Distance  Vector)  [2],  DSR  (Dynamic 
Source Routing) [3] and  AODV (Ad-hoc On-Demand Vector) 
[4]  and  so  on.  To  the  best  of  our  knowledge,  most  previous 
research  has  focused  on  protocol  establishment    and    its  
efficiency  in  MANET,  but  secure  routing  is  very  important,  
and  some  secure routing protocols based on DSR and AODV 
[5-7]  have  been  proposed  in  these  years.  Recently,    a    novel  
exploit  called  wormhole  attack  was  introduced  [8].  In  a  
wormhole  attack, attackers  “tunnel”  packets  to  another area  
of  the  network  bypassing  normal  routes  as  shown  in Figure 
1.  In practice, attackers can use high power antennas or a wired 
link,  or  other  methods.    The  resulting  route  through  the 
wormhole may have a better metric,  i.e.,  a  lower  hop-count  
than    normal  routes.    With  this  leverage,  attackers    using  
wormholes  can  easily  manipulate  the  routing  priority  in 
MANET  to  perform  eavesdropping,  packet  modification  or 
perform a DoS (Denial of Service) attack, and so on. The entire 
routing system in MANET can even be brought down using the 
wormhole attack. Its severity and influence has been analyzed in 
[9]. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The wormhole attack in MANET 
 
Mobile  wireless  ad  hoc  networks  are  fundamentally  different 
from  wired  networks,  as  they  use  wireless  medium  to 
communicate, do not rely on fixed infrastructure, and can arrange 
them into a network quickly and efficiently. In a Mobile Ad Hoc 
Network (MANET), each node serves as a router for other nodes, 
which allows data to travel, utilizing multi-hop network paths, 
beyond the line of sight without relying on wired infrastructure. 
Security in such networks, however, is a great concern [1, 2, 7, 
8]. The open nature of the wireless medium makes it easy for 
outsiders to listen to network traffic or interfere with it. Lack of 
centralized  control  authority  makes  deployment  of  traditional 
centralized security mechanisms difficult, if not impossible. Lack 
of clear network entry points also makes it difficult to implement 
perimeter-based defense mechanisms such as firewalls. Finally, 
in a MANET nodes might be battery-powered and might have 
very limited resources, which may make the use of heavy-weight 
security solutions undesirable [2, 3, 7, 8, 13]. A wormhole attack 
is  a  particularly  severe  attack  on  MANET  routing  where  two 
attackers,  connected  by  a  high-speed  off-channel  link,  are 
strategically placed at different ends of a network, as shown in 
figure  1.  These  attackers  then  record  the  wireless  data  they 
overhear, forward it to each other, and replay the packets at the 
other end of the network. Replaying valid.  Our method  selects  
routes  and  “avoids”  rather  than  “identify”  the  wormhole  
resulting  in  low  cost  and overhead. We propose a multipath 
routing protocol called Multipath Hop-count Analysis efficient 
protocol which does not require any special supporting hardware. 
Furthermore, MHA is designed to use split multipath routes, so 
the  transmitted  data  is  naturally  split  into  separate  route.  An 
attacker on a particular route can not completely intercept (and 
subvert)  our  content.  The  rest  of  the  paper  is  organized  as 
follows: We review related works regarding wormhole attack in 
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Section 2. In Section 3, the proposed work. The simulations are 
given in Section 4, and Finally, we  present  our  conclusions   in 
Section 5. 
II.     RELATED WORK ON WORMHOLE ATTACK 
In  this  section,  we  introduce  the  mechanism  for  detecting  the 
wormhole attacks. To identifies misbehaving nodes and avoids 
routing through theses nodes, watchdog and pathrater is proposed 
in  [11].  In  this  technique,  watchdog  identifies  misbehavior  of 
nodes by copying packets and maintained a buffer for recently 
sent packets. The overheard packet is compared  with  the sent 
packet, if there is a match then discards that packet. If the packet 
is timeout, increment the failure tally for the node. And if the 
tally  exceeds  the  thresholds,  then  node  will  misbehave.  The 
implementation of watchdog technique is shown in Fig.2. 
  
  
  
 
Figure 2: Watchdog implementation 
 
In  this  figure,  it  is  assumed  that  bidirectional  communication 
symmetry  on  every  link  between  nodes  that  want  to 
communicate. If a node can receive a message from a node at 
time , then node could  instead have received a  message from 
node  at  the  time  will  implement  the  watchdog.  It  maintain  a 
buffer  of  recently  sent  packets  and  compares  each  overheard 
packet  with  the  packet  in  the  buffer,  when  forwards  a  packet 
from to with the help of , can overhear transmission and capable 
of verifying that has attempted to pass the packet towards . But 
this  approach  has  some  limitations  and  it  is  not  detect  the 
misbehaving  node  during  ambiguous  collisions,  receiver 
collisions, false misbehavior and collusion.  
The approach is used directional antenna to detect and prevent 
the wormhole attack [12]. The technique is assumed that nodes 
maintain accurate sets of their neighbors. So, an attacker cannot 
execute  a  wormhole  attack  if  the  wormhole  transmitter  is 
recognized as a false neighbor and its messages are ignored. To 
estimate the direction of received signal and angle of arrival of a 
signal it  uses directional antennas. This scheme  works only  if 
two  nodes  are  communicating  with  each  other,  they  receive 
signal at opposite angle. But this scheme is  failed only if the 
attacker  placed  wormholes  residing  between  two  directional 
antennas.  
Statistical analysis scheme [13] is based on relative frequency of 
each  link  which  is  part  of  the  wormhole  tunnel  and  that  is 
appears in the set of all obtained routes. In this techniques, it is 
possible  to  detect  unusual  route  selection  frequency  by  using 
statistical  analysis  detected  and  will  be  used  in  identifying 
wormhole  links.  This  method  do  not  requires  any  special 
hardware or any changes in existing routing protocols. It does not 
require even the aggregation of any special information, since it 
uses routing data that is already available to a node the main idea 
behind  this  approach  resides  in  the  fact  that  the  relative 
frequency of any link that is part of the wormhole tunnel, will be 
much higher than other normal links.  
In [14] is discussed graph theoretic model that can characterize 
the  wormhole  attack  and  can  ascertain  the  necessary  and 
sufficient  conditions  for  the  candidate  solution  to  prevent 
wormhole attack. This scheme is also discussed a cryptographic 
based solution through local broadcast key and to set up a secure 
wireless  ad  hoc  network  against  wormhole  attacks.  In  this 
scheme, there are two types of nodes in the network named as: 
guards and regular nodes. Guards access uses GPS to access the 
location  information  or  other  localization  method  like  secure 
range  independent  localization  for  wireless  sensor  network  is 
presented in [15] and rebroadcast location data. Regular nodes 
need to calculate their location relative to the guards’ beacons, 
thus they are able to distinguish abnormal transmission due to 
beacon retransmission done through the wormhole attackers. In 
this  scheme,  sender  is  encrypted  all  transmissions  from  local 
broadcast key and these information  must be decrypted at the 
receiver end. But this scheme will be suffer the time delay to 
accumulate per node traveled and special localization equipment 
is needed to guard nodes for detecting positions.  
To  mitigate  the  wormhole  attack  in  mobile  ad  hoc  network, 
cluster  based  technique  is  proposed  in  [15].  In  this  approach 
clusters are  formed to detect the  wormhole attack. The  whole 
network  is  divided  into  clusters.  These  clusters  can  either  be 
overlapped  or  disjoint.  Member  nodes  of  cluster  pass  the 
information  to  the  cluster  head  and  cluster  head  is  elected 
dynamically.  This  cluster  heads  maintains  the  routing 
information  and  sends  aggregated  information  to  all  members 
within cluster. In this scheme, there is a node at the intersection 
of  two  clusters  named  as  guard  node.  The  guard  node  has 
equipped  with  power  to  monitor  the  activity  of  any  node  and 
guard  the  cluster  from  possible  attack.  The  network  is  also 
divided into outer layer and inner layer. The cluster head of outer 
layer is having the responsibility of informing all nodes of the 
inner layer about the presence of the malicious node.  
To  prevent  and  detect  the  wormhole  attack  most  common 
approach is discussed in [1] and [13], known as packet leashes 
mechanism.  In  this  paper,  they  are  presented  two  types  of 
leashes: geographic leashes and temporal leashes also presented 
an authentication protocol. The authentication protocol is named 
as TESLA [13] with instant key disclosure and this protocol, for 
use  with  temporal  leashes.  In,  geographic  leashes  each  node 
access  GPS  information  and  based  on  loose  clock 
synchronization. Whereas temporal leashes require much tighter 
clock synchronization (in the order of nanoseconds), but do not 
tightly depend on GPS information and temporal leashes that are 
implemented with a packet expiration time. The observation of 
this scheme is geographic leashes are less efficient than temporal 
leashes,  due  to  broadcast  authentication,  where  precise  time 
synchronization is not easily achievable.  
Other  temporal  leashes  wormhole  prevention  technique  is 
discussed in [13] based on time of flight of individual packets. 
This  scheme  is  to  measure  round-trip  travel  time  with  its 
acknowledgment. This technique is used merkle hash tree and 
hash chains as explained in TESLA.  
An efficient detection method known as delay per hop indication 
(DelPHI) for wormhole attack prevention is discussed in [14]. 
The  protocol  is  developed  for  hidden  wormhole  attack  and 
exposed  wormhole  attack.  In  this  scheme,  sender  will  check 
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routing  path  by  that  they  will  receive  and  implement  the 
wormhole  attacks.  This  scheme  will  not  require  clock 
synchronization, position information of nodes and any special 
types  of  hardwares.  Pathrater  technique  [11]  calculates  path 
metric for every path. By keeping the ratings of each node in the 
network, the path metric is calculated by using the node rating 
and  connection  reliability  which  is  obtained  from  previous 
experience.  Once  the  path  metric  has  been  calculated  for  all 
accessible paths, Pathrater will select the path with the highest 
metric. The path metrics would enable the Pathrater to select the 
shortest path. Thus it avoids routes that may have misbehaving 
nodes. 
III.  PROPOSED WORK 
We have performed the simulation of the proposed scheme in 
Opnet Network Modeler 14.0 to prove practical efficiency of the 
scheme; the physical parameter considerations are same as taken 
in mathematical modeling. The steps of modeling in FSM (Finite 
State Machine) of Proposed Algorithm are as follows: 
  
Step1. Randomly Generate a Number in between 0 to maximum 
number of nodes. 
Step2. Make the Node with same number as transmitter node. 
Step3. Generate the Route from selected transmitting node to any 
destination node with specified average route length. 
Step4. Send packet According to selected destination and start 
timer to count hops and delay.  
Step5. Repeat the process and store routes and their hops and 
delay. 
Step6.  Now  if  the  hop  count  for  a  particular  route  decreases 
abruptly for average hop count then at least one node in 
the route must be attacker.   
Step7. Now check the delay of all previous routes which involve 
any on node of the suspicious route. Now the node not 
encounter previously should be malicious let there are N 
such nodes. 
Step8.  In  N  ==  1  then  it  is  the  attacker  else  wait  for  future 
sequences which shows deviation and involve only one of 
N nodes.   
Step9. These nodes are black listed by the nodes hence they are 
not involved in future routes. 
Step10.  Whole process (from step1 to step9) is repeated until we 
didn’t get the specified goal (goal can be  
        1. To get complete list of malicious nodes.  
        2. To run for specified time. 
        3. To run for specific number of packets etc.   
 
IV.    SIMULATION ANALYSIS AND RESULT 
For the simulation we have created node models, process models, 
& packet models, we also used some predefined node models 
from  library.  The  details  of  models  with  their  technical 
parameters are as follows  
 
Total Nodes = 50  
Infected node=6 
Packet size = 1024 bits constant 
Applying protocol=DSDV 
Packet inter arrival time = 1sec. constant 
Data Rate = 11 Mbps. 
Area = 20 square Km. 
Destination Address = Random.  
Modulation = BPSK 
Antenna = Omni Directional 
 
 
 
Figure: 4.1 node distribution without worm hole attack 
 
 
 
Figure: 4.2 node distribution with 6 wormhole infected 
node 
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Attack reduces the average hop count by 25% (shown in blue) 
from normal condition (shown in red) which shows the selection 
of attaching node in route, the proposed algorithm significantly 
regains the hop counts by avoiding the attacker (shown in green)     
      
 
Figure: 4.4 Average delays per route comparison. 
  
Attack reduces the average delay by 75% (shown in blue) from 
normal  condition  (shown  in  red)  which  shows  the  shorting  of 
route  by  attacking  route,  the  proposed  algorithm  have  much 
better delay which presents the elimination of attacker (shown in 
green).     
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Our method provides good performance for detecting tunneling 
attacks it detects 75 percent of attackers within five minutes, In 
addition,  since  we  only  select  part  of  the  searched  routes  for 
multi-path transmission, the probability that attacks can occupy 
the route are further reduced. In another scenario, attackers may 
maliciously modify other nodes instead of itself in the graylist. 
Thus the nodes that have been modified would be reported as 
modifiers  and  be  blocked  by  the  source  node.  To  counter  
this,  some  ID-based  cryptographic methods [15] such as digital 
signatures can be adopted to prevent this. 
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